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12 May 1971


MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Long Range Planning Group

SUBJECT : Further Discussion on Improving the Office  
of Security Image - 15 June 1971

At the Long Range Planning Group meeting of 11 May 1971 the following suggestions to improve the image of the Office of Security were noted. The suggestions are outlined, not in the order of merit, but as they were provided in sequence.

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1. Consideration of the desirability of utilizing women in conducting name checks at [REDACTED] and/or in conducting investigations.
2. Encourage a program whereby the best speakers from the Office would make presentations at the various Agency courses on topics which they really are expert in explaining; also explaining the variety of services provided by OS and our compassionate assistance approach to employee problems.
3. Utilize the Support Bulletin to advertise the services of EAB. ✓
4. Generate a Poster Program to plug the image OS wishes to convey. ✓
5. Draw upon the various examples of cases handled by PSD to show how OS helps the employees of the Agency in any reasonable way it can. ✓



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6. ~~Area~~ Security Officers should strive to establish greater rapport with their contacts; an example of case officer relationship was given.

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8. Look into the problem of communication between supervisor and subordinates. In support assignments, supervisors should know what a subordinate can and cannot do.

9. Legitimize some of the things which OS does but receives no budgetary remuneration for.

10. Realign the image of the Office to stress professionalism rather than the helping hand.

11. The No. 1 image to foster is competence and the excellence of management.

12. Embark on an educative process whereby the thrust of our contact with the young is not noting a regulation, method, or instruction but explaining the why and how behind them.

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13. This item represents a comprehensive paper by [REDACTED] on the subject of image, which is attached. The obvious thought and work involved in its presentation might lend itself to an entire meeting.

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[REDACTED]

Secretary  
Long Range Planning Group

Attachment

Distribution:

Orig - Adse (returned for filing)

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13.

OFFICE OF SECURITY  
"IMAGE"

PROBLEM:

We must first establish, through self-examination, the following; to determine if there is a problem, and what it is:

- a. What is our image now?
- b. What "image" do we wish to portray? Is this to be a "true" image or is it to be contrived?
- c. How do we convey and enhance the "image" we wish to portray?
- d. What "false images" already exist? Are any of them "real?" How do we dispell the "false images?"

What is Our Image Now--A Self-Examination'

We must next examine what our "image" is. The following are intended to be thought-provoking, and are not necessarily applicable to the total "image." They may be the correct methods or they may be the wrong ones. Any practices, however, which can potentially be cited by Agency employees in an adverse sense, reflect poorly on the Office of Security and must be recognized as such. If they are "necessary evils" which must be accepted in implementing our mission, then this must be accepted. If they are not, they must be examined to achieve remedial action.

- a. Policy. Is our policy clearly stated? Do we indicate a firm adherence to criteria established by regulation, employee code of conduct and Executive Order 10450, or are we overly flexible--beyond that which is temperate--in "writing the rules as we go along" or through injudicious use of ad hoc decisions rather than reference to promulgated criteria. Do we attempt to "legislate" morals, ethics, and political activity beyond regulatory guidelines.

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b. Equal Treatment. Do we enforce regulations equally, or are there obvious cases of preferential treatment depending on race, sex, national origin, religious preference or rank? If such cases do exist or have existed in the past, and are generally or selectively known to Agency employees, how do we take remedial action, if at all. Is misconduct interpreted by grade, rather than deed? Do we excuse breaches or regulations or the law in the case of some employees, but not in others? Do we excuse violations of the law by our employees when such would not be the case in the civil jurisdiction of the offense? Do we recommend punitive action--ranging from security violations to personal misconduct cases--impartially and uniformly?

c. Personal Privacy. Do we intrude too deeply into traditional matters reserved as private by the individual, or do we not intrude deeply enough in the interests of the Agency? Are our regulations too broad regarding outside conduct, or too narrow?

d. Personnel. Who are the personnel with whom Agency employees come most in contact? Are they experienced and selected to enhance our "professional image?" Do they present the best possible image of the Office of Security by demeanor, appearance and dress? Do they present the Office of Security as ready and willing to assist in resolving a problem, or do they too readily decline assistance or shunt the employee to another office without assisting? Do they really work toward the solution to the problem or do they only add to it? Do Office of Security employees "mix" with other Agency employees in a normal manner or are they isolated and cliquish? Do Office of Security employees sell the office to outsiders, or do they criticize it, its leadership and its policies?

e. Reputation. Do we have a reputation of courage of our convictions, or are we known as a "soft touch," wherein we can be encouraged to reverse a decision or weaken in the face of a "right approach", in the absence of reasonably supporting data?

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Do we present a multi-sided image or do we reflect only one front representing the Director of Security and the Office as one?

f. Reputation. Do we have a reputation of "trust and confidence." Have we created an image of respecting the confidence of informants and employees coming to us with personal problems? Is there any widespread knowledge or rumor to indicate otherwise?

g. Reputation. Are we feared or respected? Do we have a "police image" or a "security image?" Should our image planning reorient this view in one direction or the other? Should we present each image at different times?

h. Reputation. Does the Office have the respect of its employees? What faults, if any, do our employees see in the Office which might reflect those of the Agency's employees in general.

i. Reputation. Are we known to be decisive. Can an employee or an office come to the Office of Security and get a decision--a clear-cut decision, without hedging?

j. General. Are there any factors which tarnish our image which must be improved or remedied?

#### What Image Do We Wish to Portray?

The image we wish to portray must not be contrived. It must portray the Office of Security as we want it to be. If our present image or performance are not up to that standard, then they must be changed. Following the questions raised earlier, perhaps we can form a composite of a desirable image:

The Office of Security is established to protect sources and methods through personnel, technical and physical security programs defined by Executive Order and Agency regulations. The

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Office of Security is not a law enforcement organization, and does not have any function related thereto. In personnel security matters, the Office is guided by Agency and Federal regulations, and does not establish or have the authority to establish standards of ethics or behavior not defined by those regulations. The Office of Security is impartial in fulfilling these obligations.

The Office of Security has flexibility where such is authorized, and is always willing to listen when waivers and reconsideration of decisions are properly supported with new information or justification. Employees should feel free to consult with the Office of Security about personal problems or security weaknesses which they have observed; such consultation is confidential.

Office of Security personnel are not of one mold. They vary in specialization, background and experience, and personality. They are individuals, but in official matters they represent the Office of Security as a professional organization and do nothing which brings discredit to the Office or the Agency.

The Office of Security is always ready to "help," whether it be a minor question about organizational participation or a major question of technical and operational support. We do not shunt inquiries, we service them. When asked for a decision we give it when within our prerogative, or secure the decision through referral to higher echelons.

#### How Do We Convey and Enhance the Image

We can best convey the desired image by performance. We must "live" the image in our daily routine. We cannot pretend we are one thing and at the same time act and react differently.

But, to "live" our image is not enough. We must display it to others, not only in personal performance, but in graphic terms. Some of these might be:

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a. Establish a "security education committee, made up of Office of Security personnel of varied age, experience and specialization. This committee could regularly report to the Director of Security or his Deputy on recommendations for improving security consciousness of Agency employees. If the employees feel they are a part of the Agency's security, the task of conveying our image is less difficult.

b. Hold a "Security Week"--a "county fair"--with representatives from the major components of the Office of Security present at all times to convey our message, i. e.:

(1) Tech Division - How the Office of Security conducts searches for hostile devices; emphasis on defensive nature, rather than TSD's offensive nature, of OS programs; secure rooms.

(2) Physical Security Division - Devices used to maintain the physical integrity of the Agency; devices ranging from the type an employee might use in his home, to the more elaborate demands of sensitive activities.

(3) Personnel Security - Services we offer to help the employee comply with Agency regulations related to personal security.

(4) Counterintelligence - Security activities to thwart hostile penetration or exploitation of employees.

(5) Safety - Safety programs

(6) Investigations and operational support - What we can do for the operating division. Charts of support activity, such as mail procedures, support of defector arrival, debriefing and resettlement, etc.

(7) Polygraph - Operational support, research

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(8) Static displays for other activities

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c. Security contributions to Studies in Intelligence and the Support Bulletin should be meaningful, not ad hoc or short deadline. An article in Studies in Intelligence could relate OS assistance to a division in the arrival and handling of a defector, for example. OS should not miss the opportunity presented by such publications to "sell" the services of the Office.

d. Lecture programs - The Office of Security should not be reluctant to encourage requests for OS speakers at Agency training courses, reserve meetings, etc. An informal "speakers bureau" should be established to offer a wide range of security presentations by qualified and experienced OS personnel from the various OS components.

e. Security contribution of qualified personnel to training programs, etc., designed to prepare employees for sensitive operational assignments. Much as this is inconvenient due to manpower shortages and similar problems, we should opt for such activities when requested to provide such support.

f. A security answering service for use during duty hours, greatly unlike "x6161." A telephone number or word which is easily recalled, which an employee may call for advice on any security-related topic, be it personal or operational, and expect a prompt reply from a security officer equipped to assist him.

What "False Images" Already Exist; Are They Real; How Do We Dispel Them?

We must be constantly on the alert for instances which reflect adversely on the Office of Security, and correct them. Each security officer should be encouraged to report such situations to

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one designated senior official, not for punitive action or permanent record, but for corrective action which will prevent such occurrences in the future. Except for extremely serious matters related to personal conduct of Security officers, the designated senior officer will not insist on receiving the name of the security officer involved, but instead will seek out the root causes of the problem and recommend solutions on an Office-wide basis.

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| <b>OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP</b>  |                  |                                       |   |
| TO  | NAME AND ADDRESS | DATE                                  | INITIALS                                |
| 1   | C/ES             | 14 MAY 1971                           | <i>[Signature]</i>                      |
| 2   | DD/Security      |                                       |   |
| 3   |                  |                                       |   |
| 4   |                  |                                       |   |
| 5   |                  |                                       |   |
| 6   | [REDACTED]       |                                       |   |
| <input type="checkbox"/>  | ACTION           | <input type="checkbox"/> DIRECT REPLY | <input type="checkbox"/> PREPARE REPLY  |
| <input type="checkbox"/>  | APPROVAL         | <input type="checkbox"/> DISPATCH     | <input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDATION |
| <input type="checkbox"/>  | COMMENT          | <input type="checkbox"/> FILE         | <input type="checkbox"/> RETURN         |
| <input type="checkbox"/>  | CONCURRENCE      | <input type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION  | <input type="checkbox"/> SIGNATURE      |
| <b>Remarks:</b><br><br><p style="text-align: center;">The attached is the paper you requested<br/>for use at the next Long Range Planning Group<br/>meeting scheduled for 2 o'clock on 15 June.</p> |                  |                                       |   |
| FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER   |                  |                                       |   |
| FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.   |                  |                                       | DATE                                    |
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